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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 









JAMES M. DAVIS, individually and as Dir ector of the 
Domestic Relations Section, Luzerne County Court of 
Common Pleas; JOHN P. MULROY, individually and as 
the Court Personnel coordinator for the Luzer ne County 
Court of Common Pleas; JOSEPH COTTER, individually 
and as the Supervisor of the Enforcement Of ficers for the 
Domestic Relations; COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF 
LUZERNE COUNTY; LUZERNE COUNTY 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 
District Judge: James M. Munley 
(D.C. Civ. No. 96-cv-02223) 
 
Argued: March 13, 2001 
 
Before: ALITO and RENDELL, Circuit Judges, 
SCHWARZER, Senior District Judge* 
 





* The Honorable William W Schwarzer , Senior United States District 
Judge for the Northern District of Califor nia, sitting by designation. 
  
       PETER G. LOFTUS, ESQUIRE 
        (ARGUED) 
       The Loftus Law Firm, P.C. 
       P.O. Box V, 1207 Main Street 
       Waverly, PA 18471 
 
       Attorney for Rodney Smith, Appellant 
 
       SEAN P. McDONOUGH, ESQUIRE 
        (ARGUED) 
       75 Glenmaura National Boulevard 
       Moosic, PA 18507 
 
       Attorney for JAMES M. DAVIS, 
       individually and as Director of the 
       Domestic Relations Section, Luzerne 
       County Court of Common Pleas 
       Section, Luzerne County of Common 
       Pleas; JOHN P. MULROY, individually 
       and as the Court Personnel 
       Coordinator for the Luzerne County 
       Court of Common Pleas; JOSEPH 
       COTTER, individually and as the 
       Supervisor of the Enforcement 
       Officers for the Domestic Relations; 
       COMMON PLEAS COURT OF 
       LUZERNE COUNTY, Appellees. 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCHWARZER, Senior District Judge. 
 
Rodney Smith brought this civil rights action against 
James M. Davis, Director of the Domestic Relations Section, 
Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, and other county 
officers (the defendants), alleging violations of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. S 12101 (ADA), 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e- 
2000e-17, 42 U.S.C. SS 1983, 1988, 1985 and 1986, and 
the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. Smith, an African- 
American male with a disability (alcoholism), was employed 
by the County as a Probation Enforcement Officer from 
March 6, 1989 until November 8, 1995, when he was 
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terminated. The district court granted summary judgment 
dismissing all of Smith's claims. 
 
THE ADA CLAIM 
 
The district court determined that Smith had failed to 
establish a prima facie case under the ADA because he was 
not a "qualified individual" within the meaning of the Act. 
See Gaul v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 580 (3d 
Cir. 1998). It found that Smith had a history of absenteeism 
which rendered him not qualified to per form his job 
because he was unable to meet the attendance 
requirements. It relied on the following facts: that on two 
occasions in April and May 1995, Smith left work early 
without prior approval; that from June thr ough September 
1995, defendants became increasingly concer ned with 
respect to excessive sick leave being utilized by Smith and 
complaints from employees that Smith fr equently smelled of 
alcohol; and that in October and November 1995, Smith left 
work early claiming he was sick but was later spotted at 
drinking establishments. 
 
An employee who does not come to work on a r egular 
basis is not "qualified," Tyndall v. National Educ. Centers, 
31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1994), and an employer is not 
obligated to accommodate absenteeism attributable to 
alcoholism. See 42 U.S.C. S 12114(c); Salley v. Circuit City 
Stores, Inc., 160 F.3d 977, 981 (3d Cir. 1998). However, the 
District Court in this case erred in granting summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants on the gr ound that 
Smith failed to show that he was "qualified" for his position 
and thus failed to make out a prima facie case on his ADA 
claim. Smith admitted some of the facts on which the 
District Court relied but denied others, in particular that he 
left work without prior approval. When the summary 
judgment record is viewed in the light most favorable to 
Smith, we cannot say that a reasonable factfinder would 
have to conclude that Smith was unqualified due to 
excessive absenteeism. Therefore, this factual issue will 
need to be resolved at trial. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. 
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509-10 (1993). 
 
Although Luzerne County is not entitled to summary 
judgment on the ground that Smith failed to make out a 
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prima facie case, Luzerne County would nonetheless be 
entitled to summary judgment if it made a showing that 
Smith's firing was for a legitimate reason, and Smith, in 
turn, failed to create a genuine issue r egarding that issue. 
Accordingly, we must examine whether Luzer ne County has 
shown a legitimate reason for Smith's ter mination. It is 
undisputed that Smith was told he was terminated for 
"violation of Luzerne County's drug and alcohol policy." The 
declarations submitted by his two supervisors, Cotter and 
Mulroy, simply state that he was informed he was 
terminated "as a result of his violation of Luzerne County's 
Drug and Alcohol Policy." However, ther e does not seem to 
be anything in the summary judgment recor d specifying 
precisely what aspect of this policy Smith was found to 
have violated. The appellees' brief contends, and the 
District Court agreed, that Smith was fir ed for absenteeism, 
but the supervisors' declarations do not mention 
absenteeism, and the drug and alcohol policy contains no 
provision about absenteeism or sick leave that applies to 
Smith's termination. While absenteeism may have been 
what defendants had in mind when they terminated him, 
there is a genuine issue as to whether this r eason was 
legitimate or pretextual, particularly since there is evidence 
that Smith performed his duties to the apparent 
satisfaction of his supervisors for over six years and carried 
a case load substantially higher than his coworkers. It may 
be that Smith was fired for some other legitimate reason 
related to alcohol use, but without specific evidence that 
Smith was fired for such a reason, summary judgment in 
favor of the county cannot be sustained on those gr ounds. 
 
The record thus raises an issue of fact as to whether 
Smith's termination was for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason or whether it was a pretext for discrimination in 
violation of the ADA. Because the explanation pr ovided by 
defendants--violation of the drug and alcohol policy--(apart 
from not being the ground on which summary judgment 
was granted) did not tell Smith what he did to bring about 
his termination, it is not legally sufficient to entitle 
defendants to judgment as a matter of law. Cf. T exas Dept. 
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 
(1981); see also Impact v. Firestone, 893 F.2d 1189, 1194 
(11th Cir. 1990) ("Appellant next ar gues that the record is 
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replete with nondiscriminatory reasons for[its employment 
actions] . . . . The difficulty here, however, is that the 
defendant never articulated to the magistrate that these 
were in fact the reasons for the particular challenged 
action") (quoting Uviedo v. Steves Sash & Door Co., 738 




The District Court found that defendants had pr offered a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for ter minating Smith 
and that Smith had failed to demonstrate that the r eason-- 
absenteeism and violation of the drug and alcohol policy-- 
was merely pretextual. 
 
It is not disputed that Smith established all but one of 
the elements of a prima facie case under Title VII: He is an 
African-American male, he was terminated, and he was 
replaced by a white female. See Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 
759 (3d Cir. 1994). What we have said above with respect 
to the remaining element--whether he was qualified for the 
job--and with respect to the reason for the termination that 
the defendants offered applies with equal force to this 
claim. Therefore, summary judgment in favor of the 




The District Court rejected Smith's retaliation claim for 
failure to show that he suffered an adverse employment 
action causally related to his filing a complaint with the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission. Smith ar gues 
that harassment to which he was exposed befor e the filing 
of the complaint increased afterward. W e find no error in 
the dismissal of this claim. 
 
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
 
The District Court held that Smith's claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress was barr ed by the 
Pennsylvania Worker's Compensation Act, which provides 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Salley v. Circuit City Stores,Inc., 160 F.3d 977 (3d Cir. 1998),does 
not 
support the summary judgment in this case. Summary judgment was 
granted there because Salley, who had admitted violating management 
policies, was a current drug user and ther efore unprotected by the ADA. 
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the sole remedy for injuries allegedly sustained during the 
course of employment. Smith does not challenge that ruling 
on appeal. 
 
CLAIMS UNDER SS 1983, 1985, 1986 AND 1988 
 
The District Court dismissed the S 1983 claim essentially 
because Smith's rights were not violated by his termination. 
In view of our reversal of the summary judgment on the 
civil rights claims, we will reverse the dismissal of the 




The District Court dismissed this claim for lack of 





We reverse the judgment with respect to the ADA, Title 
VII, and S 1983 claims and remand for further proceedings. 
We affirm the judgment with r espect to the remaining 
claims. 
 
REVERSED in part, AFFIRMED in part, and REMANDED. 
Each party to bear its own costs. 
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